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J u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953, as amend-
ed). 
N a t u r e o f P r o c e e d i n g s 
This is a negligence and products liability action in which, prior to completion of discovery, 
defendants Reyco Industries, Inc. ("Reyco") and AJ Industries, Inc. (MAJM) moved for summary 
judgment in their favor. Partial summary judgment was granted by the trial court and is appealed 
here. 
S t a t e m e n t o f I s s u e s 
There are basically two issues presented on appeal. The first is whether the trial court 
erred in conducting the hearing on defendants' motion for summary judgment despite defective 
notice and inadequate opportunity for plaintiffs counsel to prepare. The second major issue is 
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment at all where: (1) discovery was not 
completed and, in fact, plaintiff had not conducted any substantive discovery, (2) in a negligence or 
products liability action where all of the issues raise questions of fact which are material to the 
cause of action, (3) the court failed to view the facts most favorably toward plaintiff and entered 
findings of fact indicating a weighing of evidence, and (4) there were still other material issues of 
fact in dispute. 
D e t e r m i n a t i v e P r o v i s i o n s 
Constitutional Provisions 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7. 
1 
Rules 
Rule 56. Summary Judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at 
least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, 
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
S t a t e m e n t o f t h e C a s e 
SMP, Inc. ("SMP") brought this case against defendants for negligent manufacture of 
flatbed trailers made to order for plaintiffs use in its business of hauling large pipes. Prior to 
plaintiff completing its discovery, defendants Reyco and AJ moved for partial summary judgment in 
their favor. 
After the motion for summary judgment had been filed, a court clerk mailed Plaintiffs 
counsel notice of a hearing on defendant's Motion for Overlength Memorandum. Appearing at the 
hearing on that motion, plaintiffs counsel discovered that the hearing was to be conducted on 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. At that time, the judge's clerk admitted sending the 
erroneous notice. In spite of this, the court indicated it wished to proceed with the argument and 
court conducted the hearing. Partial summary judgment was ordered by the court. It is from this 
order of partial summary judgment that plaintiff appeals. 
S t a t e m e n t o f F a c t s 
1. SMP ordered from Thayco Manufacturing, Inc. ('Thayco"), the manufacturer, a number 
of flatbed trailers which were to be used in SMP's business of hauling large pipes. 
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2. Thayco, as part of its manufacturing process, ordered sub-assemblies from Reyco or its 
and its subsidiary AJ Industries. Lynn Docherty, the purchasing agent for Thayco, was unsure what 
specific assemblies were needed and enlisted the assistance of an agent for Reyco, who specified, by 
part number only, the assemblies he determined were adequate for use in the manufacturing of 
plaintiffs trailers. 
3. During the manufacturing process this same agent for Reyco, a Bob Wells, visited 
Thayco's plant and although there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not he actually 
inspected the trailers, it is undisputed that he did observe Thayco's operation and said everything 
was all right. 
4. All of the trailers made for plaintiff by Thayco were defective and all of the trailer 
damages were either traced to or caused by the sub assemblies provided by Reyco. 
S u m m a r y o f t h e A r g u m e n t 
The Utah constitution imposes a due process requirement prior to depriving an individual 
of any property right, including a proper legal cause of action. As one of the requirements of 
procedural due process, a party is entitled to notice of hearing sufficient to convey accurate infor-
mation regarding the hearing in a manner to permit preparation for the hearing. 
Plaintiff received a notice of hearing on defendant's Motion for Overlength Memorandum 
which failed to give any indication of the court's intent to hear arguments on the motion for sum-
mary judgment. Plaintiffs counsel appeared at the hearing believing that the motion to be heard 
was the one specified in the notice. Minimizing the effect of the defective notice, the court heard 
the motion for summary judgment and entered an order against plaintiff. 
Because the notice failed to provide sufficient information for plaintiff to prepare for the 
summary judgment argument, including but not limited to preparation and submission of appropri-
ate affidavits, it was defective and failed to measure up to procedural due process requirements. 
As a result, the summary judgment entered should be declared void on constitutional grounds. 
In evaluating plaintiffs claims, the trial court failed to acknowledge that a negligence or 
products action is inherently filled with questions of fact which by their nature preclude summary 
judgment. There were several genuine issues of material fact related to the cause of action which 
should have been considered to deny summary judgment. These facts should have been viewed 
most favorably toward the plaintiff without an actual weighing and finding of facts from the evi-
dence. The court failed to do so, but instead viewed them most favorably toward the moving 
defendants, evaluated the evidence and entered findings of fasts. 
Further, it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment prior to completion of plaintiffs 
discovery, precluding his uncovering of additional facts relevant to the causes of action. Plaintiff 
had not conducted essential discovery at the time of the motion and the only discovery by deposi-
tion which had been completed was undertaken by defendants Reyco and AJ in their depositions of 
employees of the other defendants. 
Any of these failures by the trial court would support reversal of the summary judgment. 
The combination of these failures indicates clear error by the trial court in its handling of the 
summary judgment motion and clearly justifies reversal of the judgment. 
A r g u m e n t 
POINT I 
FAILURE TO GIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE TRUE 
NATURE OF THE HEARING RESULTED IN THE COURT 
DEPRIVING SMP OF ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
REYCO AND AJ IN VIOLATION OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The Utah Constitution provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or proper-
ty, without due process of law. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7. A cause of action with a 
legitimate basis is a vested right in the nature of a property right which is entitled to this constitu-
4 
tional due process protection. Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 U. 39, 300 P. 1040; McGrew 
v. Industrial Comrru, 96 U. 203, 208 P. 538. 
The fundamental requirement of procedural due process is that a party be informed of the 
nature of the hearing and be given the opportunity to be heard on that matter. Worrall v. Ogden 
City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980). The opportunity to be heard is insufficient without 
proper notice of the nature of the hearing. Id. This Court in Worrall stated the characteristics of 
proper notice: 
The notice must be of such a nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information.1 In assessing the adequacy of a notice the 
central issue is whether the communication contains the type of 
information which is reasonably calculated to afford the informant 
an opportunity to be heard at a proper time and in a proper man-
ner. 
Id. at 601-602. The fundamental issue related to procedural due process is that of fairness to the 
party being notified. Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed a similar notice of hearing question in Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). In Nelson, the trial court gave verbal notice that a case was 
to be set for a hearing on a specified date, following the court's law and motion calendar. A 
subsequent minute entry stated that "'[pjlaintiff s motion is granted and this matter is set for hear-
ing. . .'" Id. at 1212. Based upon that notice, counsel expected to attend a hearing on the date 
specified. Instead, counsel received a separate notice that the matter had been set for trial two 
days after he received the separate notice. 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had set forth the require-
ments of adequate notice: 
'Citing Midlane v. Central Hanover Bank &. Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-315, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 
(1950). 
2Citing Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., Alaska, 520 P.2d 1352, 1356-1357 (1974). 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably cal-
culated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pres-
ent their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reason-
ably to convey the required information, and it; must afford a reason-
able time for those interested to make their appearance. 
Id. at 1212, emphasis added.3 The Utah Supreme Court also noted that "where notice is ambigu-
ous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature of the proceedings against him or not given 
sufficiently in advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a party is deprived of due process.H 
Id. at 1212, emphasis added.4 The court then held the notice in Nelson to be constitutionally 
deficient, "because it described the nature of the proceedings against him in such ambiguous terms 
that it deprived him of adequate time to prepare his defense." Id. 
In the present case, plaintiff received notice only of a hearing on defendants' Motion for 
Overlength Memorandum. Plaintiffs counsel attended the scheduled hearing with no prior indica-
tion that the motion for summary judgment would be heard. Plaintiff was clearly deprived of 
adequate time to properly prepare for the hearing. Further, plaintiff was deprived of the opportu-
nity, pursuant to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to serve opposing affidavits prior to 
the day of hearing on the summary judgment motion, because it had no notice of when the hearing 
on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment would be held. 
Because of the finality of a hearing on summary judgment, plaintiff was entitled procedural 
due process protection, including adequate notice. The notice of hearing in this case did not 
comply with those due process requirements, making the hearing improper. The subsequently 
entered summary judgment, therefore, is void and should be set aside. 
Citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &. Trust Co,, note 1 above. 
Citing Graham v. Sawaya, Utah, 632 P.2d 851 (1981). 
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POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHEN THERE EXISTED GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND MORE WERE LIKELY TO BE RE-
VEALED THROUGH DISCOVERY. 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE THERE CONTINUE TO BE 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Because negligence issues present primarily questions of fact, the trial court is obliged to 
grant summary judgment only in the rarest of situations. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 
P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). Summary judgment is inappropriate in negligence cases except where 
two conditions are met: (1) the standard of care is fixed by law and (2) reasonable minds evaluating 
the evidence could reach only one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence. Wycalis v. Guardian 
Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (UtahApp. 1989). Only in the most clear cut of negligence cases is 
summary judgment appropriate. Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). Further, 
because summary judgment denies the losing party its constitutional privilege to a trial, "'doubt or 
uncertainty as to the questions of negligence . . . should be resolved in favor of granting . . . a 
trial.'" Wycalis at 825, citing Butler v. Sports Haven Int% 563 P.2d 1245, 1246 (Utah 1977). 
In this case, several allegations of negligence were made against Reyco and AJ. SMP 
ordered trailers to be manufactured for a specific purpose: hauling of heavy pipe. Thayco, the 
manufacturer, relied upon the expertise of its suppliers in identifying which of their products were 
proper for installation in the trailers. Those suppliers, Reyco and AJ, knew the intended purpose 
and specified which product was appropriate for that use. They failed, however, as part of the 
delivery to include the necessary support bracing. This negligence subsequently resulted in failure 
of the trailers. 
Reyco and AJ contend that they supplied installation instructions which clearly showed the 
necessary bracing and indicated that the installer should obtain the bracing locally. However, these 
instructions were not shipped with the sub-assemblies to the point of manufacture, but were mailed 
to the purchasing agent at a different location. Due to this negligence, the sub-assemblies were not 
installed with the proper additional bracing. 
During assembly at Thayco's plant, the same representative of Reyco/AJ who ordered the 
sub-assemblies for Thayco inspected the trailer manufacturing plant and assured workers that they 
were installing the sub-assemblies properly. No bracing had been installed on the completed units 
examined by the representative. Relying on those negligent assurances, Thayco continued to 
manufacture the other trailers. All failed while being used for their intended uses. 
Whether any of these actions and inactions on the part of Reyco and AJ constituted negli-
gence is clearly a question for the finder of fact. These fact questions are clearly material to 
allocation of liability for the causes of action raised in the pleadings. There are no allegations that 
the negligence is based upon breach of any statutory duty. Nor is it clear that reasonable minds 
would have to conclude that there is no negligence on the part of Reyco or AJ. The questions of 
fact are simply not clear cut. The existence of these disputed, material facts makes summary 
judgment in this matter inappropriate. 
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
ACTION. 
Products liability actions are comprised solely of fact questions which should be determined 
by the finder of fact and are not properly disposed of by summary judgment. The issue of proxi-
mate cause of plaintiffs injuries is a fact question. Kuhnke v Textron, Inc., 684 P2d 159 (Ariz App 
1984). The issue of adequacy of instructions provided by defendant's installation drawings is also a 
question for the trier of fact. Kammer v. Lamb-Grays Harbor Co., Inc., 639 P2d 649 (Or App 
1982), review denied 648 P2d 852. Braxton v. Rotec Industries, Inc., 633 P2d 897 (Wash App 1981). 
Whether the design of the product is fundamentally flawed and would cause injury to plaintiff 
regardless of method of construction is also a question of fact. Blood v. R & R Engineering, Inc., 
769 P2d 144 (Okl 1989). 
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C OTHER QUESTIONS OF FACT EXISTED WHICH PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT IN THIS MATTER. 
It is well established that the trial court in a summary judgment inquiry must view the facts 
from a position most favorable to the plaintiff. Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 
761, 763 (Utah 1988). Likewise, the trial court is not permitted to weigh or resolve evidence in 
determining whether there are facts in dispute. Territorial Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Baird, 118 
Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 58 (Ct.App. September 26, 1989).5 Because the court is not permitted to 
weigh the evidence, findings of fact are inappropriate in a summary judgment decision. 
Reyco and AJ take several positions which do not agree with the facts as alleged by SMP. 
For example, they argue that they are mere suppliers who had no part in selecting the products. 
SMP has alleged otherwise. Reyco and AJ claim that the representative who assured Thayco that 
it was performing adequately was not qualified to do so and did not represent the companies in 
those affirmations. This is clearly a fact question. Reyco and AJ claim that the instructions were 
sent with the sub-assemblies. SMP asserts that the instructions were delivered to the purchasing 
department at a location nowhere near the assembly site. Another question of fact. 
Viewing the record in a light favorable to the plaintiff reveals several questions of fact. 
That Reyco and AJ offer a different view of these facts clearly indicates that they are disputed. 
The only way the trial court could reach the conclusion that these facts are not disputed is to have 
evaluated the evidence, finding it more credible in Reyco and AJ's favor. It is clearly not permit-
ted to do this. The findings of fact entered by the court indicate that it did, in fact, weigh the 
evidence before it. The sole inquiry in a summary judgment evaluation is whether material, disput-
ed facts exist. Territorial Savings at 58. The trial court clearly exceeded this limited area of inquiry, 
delving into the evidence supporting the findings of fact which it entered. 
There are clearly material facts which, if left undecided by the court in the summary judg-
5Citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
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ment inquiry (which they should be), need to be resolved by trial before the finder of fact. Even if 
the court will ultimately act as finder of fact, it is not permitted to do so as part of a summary 
judgment determination. Because there exist material questions of fact to be resolved, summary 
judgment in this matter is inappropriate. 
D. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE BEFORE PLAINTIFF HAS HAD OPPOR-
TUNITY TO CONDUCT ITS DISCOVERY. 
The granting of summary judgment before completion of discovery is premature and inap-
propriate. Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977). This is especially true where 
discovery is likely to provide additional facts in support of the plaintiffs allegations. Id When 
summary judgment has been objected to because discovery has not been 
completed, "the court should grant a continuance or deny the motion for summary judgment . . .M 
Id at 377. 
SMP had not completed its discovery in this matter, [n fact, the only discovery by deposi-
tion was undertaken was by Reyco and AJ in their depositions of other defendants' witnesses. The 
surface of discovery had only been scratched, much less completed. In these circumstances, the 
court was obliged to deny the motion for summary judgment until discovery had been completed. 
Summary judgment in this matter was clearly inappropriate. First, it is a negligence case in 
which virtually all of the issues are questions of fact. Second, there existed other disputed ques-
tions of fact material to the case. Third, discovery was not complete. The trial court, therefore, 
clearly erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Reyco and AJ. 
C o n c l u s i o n 
The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was improperly conducted because 
inadequate notice was provided to the plaintiff. This failure to comply with notice requirements 
deprived SMP of its constitutional due process rights. The order of summary judgment, therefore, 
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is void and should be set aside. 
Further, the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. There were several disputed 
fact questions existing and yet to be discovered. The court clearly erred in its failure to follow well 
established procedures in evaluating the summary judgment motion. The summary judgment order 
should, therefore, be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this L^f day of May, 1990. 
Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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